June 29, 2017, Thursday

5:30 pmWelcome Dinner, Howard Johnson Caida Plaza

June 30, 2017, Friday

8:30 am – 8:45 amOpening Ceremony (Guoqiang Tian), Room 511, School of Economics, SUFE
8:45 am – 9:00 amGroup Photo

Session 1 (Chair: Zhenxing Huang), Room 511, School of Economics, SUFE
9:00 am – 10:00 am(Keynote)Andrew Schotter, New York University
Title: Attention in Games: An Experimental Study
Abstract: One common assumption in game theory is that players concentrate on one game at a time. However, in everyday life, we play many games and make many decisions at the same time, and thus have to decide how best to divide our limited attention across these settings. The question posed in this paper is how do people go about solving this attention-allocation problem, and how does this decision affect the way players behave in any given game when taken in isolation. We find that particular features of the games subjects face (the maximum payoff in the game, the minimum payoff, the degree of inequality in the game's payoff, whether the game has zero payoffs, and the type of game being played), attract their attention. In addition, how much attention is given to a particular game depends on the other game or games a subject is simultaneously attending to.
10:00 am – 10:40 amTingting Ding, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Title:Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms With Intergenerational Advice
Abstract: The results of this paper should be taken as a cautionary tale by mechanism designers. While the mechanisms that economists design are typically in the form of static one-shot games, in the real world mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in the mechanism for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behavior evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer.  We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms, even those, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism where truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
10:40 am – 11:00 amTea Break
11:00 am – 11:40 amNinghua Du, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Title: I owe you…but be nice to me!---Prosocial Compliance in P2P lending: a field experiment
Abstract: We run natural field experiments to evaluate behavioral institutions to increase repayments in a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending website. The results show that the messages eliciting the lenders' positive expectations considerably improve the borrowers' repayments, while the messages emphasizing the negative conscequences to cheaters do not. Our experiments raised repayments in the sample period and were cost-free to implement, demonstrating the potential importance of such interventions in enhancing pro-social compliance in P2P lending.
11:40 am – 12:20 pmBinglin Gong, East China Normal University
Title: Cooperation through Indirect Reciprocity: Impact of Higher-Order History
Abstract: Indirect reciprocity based on certain reputation systems is an important way to promote cooperation when repeated interaction becomes rare under globalization. Theoretically, coherent notions of reputation scores require knowledge of higher-order histories. Yet, how people use the acquired higher-order information to aid cooperation decisions is an open empirical question. We study a random-matching Prisoners' Dilemma experiment with optional history information up to the second order, i.e. including the partner's own previous partners' action history. With the help of our newly defined continuous extension of some well-known reputation scores, we are the first to find that some simplified versions of standing and judging significantly affect the cooperation decision. More than half of subjects prove to be responsive to the higher-order scores, which also comes along with a certain payoff advantage. The positive reputation effect is much stronger when people have first played the baseline PD games without history information, where vanishing cooperation is inevitable. Under such a condition, subjects are also inclined to be more cooperative when both parties display high reputation scores.
12:20 pm – 2:20 pmLunch:

Session 2 (Chair: Bin Miao), Room 511, School of Economics, SUFE
2:20 pm – 3:00 pmFangwen Lu, Renmin University of China
Title: Attitudinal Consequences of Random Experience: Evidence from Beijing Car Lottery
Abstract: We conducted a representative survey of participants in Beijing car lottery. After controlling for the time of participation, whether winning a lottery or not is random. Exploiting this exogeneity, we find that winning the lottery makes people feel happier in general. Lottery winners believe they had a better luck in the car lottery, and the sense of more luck extends to other daily lottery events and even to a toss of a coin, supporting hot hand fallacy against gambler's fallacy. Winners are also 30 percentage point more likely to perceive the car lottery as being fair, and the sense of feeling just also extends to other lottery contents. However, the difference in the sense of fairness does not translate into different views on transportation policies. Both winners and losers are the same likely to support the restriction of car numbers in Beijing, and vote for Beijing car lottery against Shanghai auction. However, the ownership of car makes lottery winners more likely to prefer free parking in a shopping mall even if this would raise prices. We also find that college education mediates the attitudinal bias.
3:00 pm – 3:40 pmYe Jin, New York University Shanghai
Title: Identifying Panic
Abstract: Financial panics, or investors' premature redemptions due to the strategic complementarity among their withdrawal decisions, impair the function of liquidity provision of financial intermediations and contribute to financial fragility.  We design an experiment to identify panicking behavior in the presence of fundamental risk. By comparing subject's behavior when faced with only fundamental risk and when faced with both fundamental risk and strategic uncertainty, we get a clear separation of panic-driven and fundamental-driven withdrawal behavior. We then perform further tests of the effectiveness of regulatory policies, such as deposit insurance, on curing panics.
3:40 pm – 4:00 pmTea Break
4:00 pm – 4:40 pmSimin He, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Title: The Power and Limits of Sequential Communication in Coordination Games
Abstract: We study theoretically and experimentally the extent to which communication can solve coordination problems. We do this in the context of coordination games in which there is some conflict of interest. In contrast to existing studies, we allow players to chat sequentially and free-format. The main behavioral assumption that we make, which we dub the `feigned-ignorance principle', is that players will ignore any communication unless they reach an agreement in which both players are better off. The model predicts that communication is effective in Battle-of-the-Sexes but futile in Chicken. A remarkable implication is that increasing players' payoffs can make them worse off, by making communication futile. Our experimental findings provide strong support for these and some other predictions.
4:40 pm – 5:20 pmMaoliang Ye, Xiamen University
Title: One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?
Abstract:This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a belief-based learning model, we conduct a multiple-period, binary-choice, and weakest-link coordination experiment in the laboratory to study the effect of gradualism – increasing the required levels (“stakes”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately – on group coordination performances in high-stake projects. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, as well as starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stakes over time (the Gradualism treatment). We find that groups coordinate most successfully with high stakes in the Gradualism treatment relative to the other two treatments. We also find evidence that supports the belief-based learning model. These findings point to a simple mechanism for promoting successful voluntary coordination when other mechanisms, such as communication and information feedback, are absent or limited.
5:30 pm    Dinner:

July 1, 2017, Saturday

Session 3 (Chair: Tingting Ding), Room 511, School of Economics, SUFE
9:00 am –10:00 am(Keynote)Peter Wakker, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Title: The History of Decision under Risk and Ambiguity, Leading to Modern Experimental Economics
Abstract: This lecture describes the current state of the art in modeling risk and ambiguity attitudes as the result of interactions between empirically oriented psychologists and theoretically oriented economists, leading to modern experimental economics.  At several stages in history, the next step forward could be made only by empirical inputs and intuitions from psychologists.  At several other stages, the next step forward could be made only by theoretical inputs from economists with advanced technical skills.  Modern views on the measurement of utility, beliefs, risk, and ambiguity attitudes could only arise from the merger of ideas from all the fields mentioned.  It was primarily this development in risk and ambiguity that has led to the behavioral approach that now pervades in all economic disciplines.  The lecture ends with speculations on future directions of risk and ambiguity studies and their implications for other economic disciplines.
10:00 am – 10:40 amZhenxing Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Title: Measuring Ambiguity Attitudes for All (Natural) Events
Abstract: Measurements of ambiguity attitudes have so far focused on artificial events, where (subjective) beliefs can be derived from symmetry of events and then can be controlled for.  For natural events as relevant in applications, such a symmetry and corresponding control are usually absent, precluding traditional measurement methods.  This paper introduces two indexes of ambiguity attitudes, one for aversion and the other for insensitivity/perception, for which we can control for likelihood beliefs even if those are unknown. Hence, we can now measure ambiguity attitudes for natural events.  Our indexes are valid under many ambiguity theories, do not require expected utility for risk, and are easy to elicit in practice. We use our indexes to investigate time pressure under ambiguity.  People do not become more ambiguity averse (often argued to be normative) under time pressure, but they perceive more ambiguity and understand it less, entailing an increase of irrationality.  These findings support the validity of our indexes.
10:40 am – 11:00 amTea Break
11:00 am – 11:40 amXiangdong Qin, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Title: Intertemporal moral behaviors: theories and experiments
Abstract: "Moral behavior is an integral part of economic interactions. We conducted a series of experiments about intertemporal moral behavior to analyze and compare different courses of moral choices. Our preliminary findings indicate that “moral consistency” dominates “moral balancing”, and that “moral licensing”, rather than “moral cleansing”, plays a more prominent role in intertemporal moral decision making. Moreover, “moral licensing” is evident in both immediate and delayed moral behavior treatments, but “moral cleansing” is only observed in immediate moral behavior treatment. Our experimental evidence has provided empirical support to our theoretical model."
11:40 am – 12:20 pmHong Chao, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Title: Bird's Nest off the Menu: Evidence of Corruption from China's Frugality Campaign
Abstract:In this study we investigate corruption in China using President Xi's frugality and anticorruption campaign in 2012 as a natural experiment. The campaign banned extravagant banquets for the party members and government bureaucrats, and had drastic negative impact on the high-end dining businesses in mainland China. Using a large scale micro-level dataset based on 3.5 million dining logs of 75 restaurants in 10 cities, we apply a difference-indifference approach to examine the changes in luxury dining before and after the campaign in mainland China, relative to in Hong Kong where the campaign had little impact. We find that the consumption of luxury meals decreases substantially in mainland compared to in Hong Kong, an evidence of corruption before the inception of the campaign. We also find that the consumption of luxury meals decreases even more substantially in restaurants' public dining areas, relative to in private dining rooms. It suggests that the anti-corruption measures work more effectively under social pressure and monitoring. We also compare and contrast the degree of corruption between government agencies and other government-sponsored organizations, as well as across different categories of government agencies.
12:20 pm – 2:00 pmLunch

Session 4 (Chair: Simin He), Room 511, School of Economics, SUFE
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm(Keynote)Soohong Chew, National University Singapore
Title: When Ellsberg meets Keynes: Missing link between ambiguity attitude and source preference
Abstract: We study the link between source preference and ambiguity attitude along with reduction of compound lottery. In an experiment with more than 3000 subjects, we find that preference towards the three domains is intertwined in the following sense. First, the link between source preference and ambiguity aversion depends on whether reduction of compound lottery axiom (RCLA) is satisfied: those subjects satisficing RCLA exhibit stronger association between attitude towards ambiguity and sources of uncertainty, compared to those violating RCLA.  Second, subjects without source preference have stronger association between attitude towards ambiguity and compound lottery, compared to those subjects exhibiting source preference. Third, ambiguity neutral subjects have stronger association between attitude towards sources of uncertainty and compound lottery, compared to ambiguity no-neutral ones. These observations are robust to various ways of measuring preference towards ambiguity, sources of uncertainty and compound lotteries. Our results shed light on models of ambiguity.
3:00 pm – 3:40 pmSongfa Zhong, National University Singapore
Title: Intertemporal Consumption with Risk: A Revealed Preference Analysis
Abstract: The canonical way of representing preferences over among risky consumption streams is to combine the expected utility and discounted utility models. The resulted discounted expected utility model is separable across both states and time, and has a strong implication: the coefficient of relative risk aversion is the reciprocal of the coefficient of intertemporal substitution. Partly because this relationship has been repeatedly confounded by data, alternative models have been proposed by dispensing with either separability across states or separability across time. In this paper, we report a new experiment to elicit preferences of subjects over risky consumption streams, and derive revealed preference methods to test alternative hypotheses. Our results broadly supportthe separation of preferences across states but not across time. Furthermore, the data are consistent with the same sub-utility functions in the two states with positive time preference over intertemporal consumption.
3:40 pm – 4:00 pmTea Break
4:00 pm – 4:40 pmBin Miao, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Title: Ellsberg Meets Allais
Abstract: We experimentally examine the separability between risk preference and ambiguity preference in two setup. In the binary choice setup, we identify Allais-type behavior in a domain with both risk and ambiguity, suggesting decision makers do not  separate risk from ambiguity. In contrast, in the portfolio-choice setup where subjects choose to allocate budgets among risky and ambiguous assets, our revealed preference analysis suggests a weak separation between risk preference and ambiguity preference.

Closing: Ninghua Du
4:50 pmDinner:
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